Hoffstein and Silverman suggested a use of Low Hamming Weight Product (LHWP) to compute a random power in a group or a multiple of an element in a ring. It reduces the computation of powers in a group with fast endomorphisms such as the Galois field F 2 n and Koblitz elliptic curves. In this paper, we introduce a reduced representation of LHWP and apply them to attack the relevant cryptosystems.
Introduction
Let G be an abelian group of order q with a generator g. Given an element y ∈ G, the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) on G asks to find x ∈ Z p such that y = g x . The exponentiations can be accelerated by using exponents with special structures [5, 11, 6, 4] , but most of them appeared to have less complexity than suggested [10, 2] , and so does not give any significant advantage over the ordinary exponents.
One exception is a method to use Low Hamming Weight Products (LHWPs) suggested by Hoffstein and Silverman in [6] . They introduced a product x = x 1 x 2 x 3 of integers as an exponent over G = F 2 n , where each x i has w i nonzero digits in its binary representation. This type of exponents is called an exponent of weight (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 ) and accelerates the exponentiation g x significantly. The computational advantage comes from the extensive use of the fast endomorphism squaring in the exponentiations. For example, only 17 multiplications are required for an exponentiation by an exponent of weight (6, 7, 7) in a binary field if we use a normal basis. It can be also applied to scalar multiplications of a point in Koblitz curves, in which Frobenius map plays an role of a squaring in binary fields.
In this paper, we propose a new attack for the DLP with LHWP exponents. When the exponent is of form x = x 1 x 2 x 3 where x 1 , x 2 and x 3 are drawn from the sets X 1 , X 2 and X 3 , respectively, the complexity of the DLP was assumed to be about max{|X 1 
We improve this attack by a factor of n for G = F 2 n .
More precisely, we define a canonical representation of an element z ∈ Z/(2 n − 1) as z = 2 kz for integer k and maximum possiblez. Then we observe that x = 2 kx 1x2x3 for some k and the number of canonical elements of X is roughly |X | ≈ |X |/n. Using this we propose a variant of baby-step giantstep method [8] , whose complexity can be as small as max{|X 1 
we can further improve the attack by splitting X 1 into a sum of two elements, each of which belongs to a smaller set. For example, the complexity of the DLP with an exponent of weight (2,2,11) in a binary field was claimed to be more than 2 80 , but our algorithm solves it in 2 55.9
multiplications.
Similar attacks can be applied to a low Hamming weight product in τ -adic representation on Koblitz curves. For example, when using an exponent of weight (6, 6, 6 ) on a Koblitz curve, the complexity of the DLP is reduced from 2 80 to 2 74.4 .
The rest of papers are organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the notion of rotation-free elements for reduced representations. Using them, we analyze the DLP on binary fields and Koblitz curves in Section 3 and 4, respectively. We conclude in Section 5.
Rotation-free Elements
Let wt(x) denote the Hamming weight of x ∈ Z, which is the number of nonzero coefficients in the binary representation of x. From now on, we use a representative set {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2 n − 2} to express elements of Z/(2 n − 1). Thus x mod 2 n − 1 is the integer in this representative set which is congruent to x modulo 2 n − 1.
We define a relation ∼ on Z/(2 n − 1) as follows: Given two elements a, b ∈ Z/(2 n − 1), we define a ∼ b if and only if there exists a non-negative integer i such that a = 2 i b. Then ∼ is an equivalence relation on Z/(2 n − 1). We can simply check the followings:
Observe that a LHWP x 1 x 2 x 3 ∈ Z/(2 n − 1) is equal to 2 kx 1x2x3 where 0 ≤ k < n andx i is an element of the equivalence class of x i . To reduce the redundancy of the representations of LHWPs, we need a subset of Z/(2 n − 1) which includes a set of representatives of the equivalence classes and is easily generated.
All the rotation-free elements of weight k can be easily generated by the following algorithm. Note that the corresponding k-tuple for a rotation-free element satisfies
Algorithm 1 (Generation of Rotation-free Elements)
Note that the largest element of each equivalence class is a rotation-free element. Hence we can see that there is at least one rotation-free element in each equivalence class of Z/(2 n − 1) with respect to the relation ∼.
Now we show that this number is not far from the number of equivalence classes.
Theorem 1 Let n, k be positive integers with k < n and RF(n, k) be the number of rotation-free elements of weight k in Z/(2 n −1). We have the followings:
(2) There is at least one rotation-free element in each equivalence class.
The difference E(n, k) between RF(n, k) and the number of equivalence classes on Z/(2 n − 1) is at most
PROOF. We express an element z of weight k in Z/(2 n − 1) uniquely as
where a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a k are positive integers such that
Note that a rotation-free element z is the element of the form with a 0 = 0 and a i ≥ a 1 . Hence RF(n, k) is the number of solutions (a 1 , . . . , a k ) satisfying a 1 + · · · + a k = n and a i ≥ a 1 . Equivalently, it is the number of non-negative solutions (a 2 , . . . , a k ) satisfying a 2 + · · · + a k = n − ka 1 . Given a positive integer a 1 , the number of such (k − 1)-tuples is the number of multisets of cardinality (k − 1) with elements taken from a set of cardinality (n − ka 1 ), that is
. If we sum up
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n/k, we obtain RF(n, k).
Assume z is a maximal element in an equivalence class. Then a 0 must be zero. Otherwise, 2 a 0 z is equivalent to and larger than z, which contradicts with the maximality of z. Moreover, a 1 must be the smallest one among a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a k . Otherwise, we have i > 1 such that a 1 > a i , which implies 2 a 0 +a 1 +···+a i−1 z mod (2 n − 1) = 2 n−1 + 2 n−1−a i + · · · + 2 a i−1 is equivalent to and larger than z. Therefore z is a rotation-free element.
Assume the set L of elements z satisfying a 0 = 0 and a i > a 1 for all i > 1. Then any element z in L is the unique maximal element of the equivalence class containing z. Moreover, the cardinality of L is the number of solutions (a 1 , . . . , a k ) satisfying a 1 + · · · + a k = n and a i > a 1 . Or the number of nonnegative solutions (a 2 , . . . , a k ) satisfying a 2 +· · ·+a k = n−ka 1 −(k−1). Given a positive integer a 1 , the number of such (k−1)-tuples is the number of multisets of cardinality (k − 1) with elements taken from a set of cardinality (n − ka 1 
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ (n + 1)/k − 1, we obtain the cardinality L. Then the difference between RF(n, k) and the cardinality L is obtained using Pascal's identity. 2
Binary Fields
In order to speed up exponentiations in a binary field F 2 n , Hoffstein and Silverman [6] proposed a use of exponent x = x 1 x 2 x 3 ∈ Z/(2 n − 1) where x 1 , x 2 and x 3 are integers of low weights in Z/(2 n − 1) for n ≈ 1000. We will call x a (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 ) exponent if wt(x 1 ) = w 1 , wt(x 2 ) = w 2 , wt(x 3 ) = w 3 . They proposed two types of exponents for 2 80 security: (6, 7, 7) exponents and (2, 2, 11) exponents.
(6, 7, 7) Exponents
Let x = x 1 x 2 x 3 be a (6, 7, 7) exponent in F 2 n . The attack complexity to recover x from g and g x with a (6, 7, 7) exponent x was claimed to be n 6
by checking the equation y
For this exponent, only 5+6+6=17 multiplications are required for one exponentiation.
Now we propose another attack. We may rewrite x as x = 2 kx 1x2x3 for rotation-free elementsx 1 ,x 2 ,x 3 of weight (6, 7, 7) and 0 ≤ k < n. Then we check the following equation by storing the left-hand side after sorting and comparing them with the right-hand side:
Then the complexity is n · RF(n, 7) + RF(n, 6) · RF(n, 7)
which is about 2 87.8 for n = 1000. If we pick up only one element from one equivalence class, the complexity becomes lower, but the difference is at most E(1000, 6)E(1000, 5) ≤ 2 77.7 .
(2, 2, 11) Exponents
Let x = x 1 x 2 x 3 be a (2, 2, 11) exponent in F 2 n . The attack complexity of the discrete logarithms with this type of exponents for n = 1000 was claimed to be 2 84.3 by Baby-step Giant-step, which checks the equation:
Then the search space for the left-hand side is n 2 2 = 2 37.9 and the search space for the right-hand side is n 11 = 2 84.3 for n = 1000. In this case, only 1+1+10=12 multiplications are required for one exponentiation.
We may rewrite x as x = 2 kx 1x2x3 for 0 ≤ k < n and rotation-free elements x 1 ,x 2 ,x 3 with weight (2, 2, 11). Then we check the following equation by storing the left-hand side after sorting and comparing them with the right-hand side:
Then the complexity is n · RF(n, 2) 2 + RF(n, 11) ≈ 2 74.4 .
However, we have more efficient attacks. We may rewritex 3 as 2 k x 3 = x 3 +x 3 for some k where x 3 is an element of weight 3 andx 3 is a rotation-free element of weight 8 in Z/(2 n − 1). Then we can write x = 2 kx 1x2 (x 3 +x 3 ) and check the following equation:
Then the complexity is
, n = 1000.
Koblitz Curves: τ -adic Exponents
Koblitz curve is an elliptic curve over F 2 n defined by
Let τ be a Frobenius map on E:
Then Frobenius map is efficiently computable on E(F 2 n ) and plays a similar role to squaring in binary fields. The secret exponent N is taken to be
A scalar multiplication of a point on the curve by N requires only 6 + 6 + 6 elliptic additions when using normal basis, where the squaring and so τ operation is almost free. On the other hand, the attack complexity of the discrete logarithms with this type of exponents was claimed to be
by checking the equation N −1
3 Q = N 1 N 2 P for given P and Q = N P .
We say N = where 0 ≤ k < 163 andN 1 ,N 2 ,N 3 are rotation free Frobenius expansions of weight 7. In this case, however, we allow −1 coefficients as well as 0 and 1, and so 2 6 · RF(n, 7) is the number of rotation-free Frobenius expansions. Then the complexity to check τ
If we consider only the pairs (N 1 ,N 2 ) withN 1 ≤N 2 , then it becomes 2 74.5 .
We can reduce the complexity more by considering τ -adic Non-Adjacent Forms (τ -adic NAF) [9] . We can write N i as a τ -adic NAF with weight at most t = 7, whose number is given by n−t+1 t 2 t [1] . Then the complexity is at most
Also by considering the caseN 1 ≤N 2 only, we have the final complexity 2 74.4 .
They proposed parameters with more security margin: N = N 1 N 2 N 3 with weights (8, 9, 9) and N = N 1 N 2 N 3 N 4 with weights (4, 5, 7, 8) . The total search spaces were claimed to be 2 163.9 and 2 160.5 , but our methods a bit reduce them to 2 157.4 and 2 157.5 . However, the attack complexities using proposed rotationfree Frobenius maps are still more than 2 80 .
Conclusion
The use of LHWPs as exponents in the DLP, proposed by Hoffstein and Silverman, prevents efficient applications of meet-in-the-middle attacks, and so accelerates exponentiations significantly in a group with fast endomorphisms such as binary fields or Koblitz curves. In this paper, we proposed a reduced representation of LHWPs and exploited them to reduce the complexity of the relevant hard problems by a factor of 2 5 through 2 25 . Our analysis shows that some of suggested parameters are not secure anymore. However, we remark that some other parameters (with more security margin) are still secure and give significant advantages in efficiency.
Since Erdös and Newman [3] , there have been several studies to find a set of exponents whose Baby-step Giant-step complexity against the DLP is larger than the square root of the cardinality of the exponents set. (Refer to [7] for the survey of this problem and recent results.) A LHWP is a good candidate for this problem when the order of the base group is of special form. We note that our attack is generic on such a special group in the sense that it does not use any information about the representation of elements, but not applicable to general groups in which the relation ∼ may not form an equivalent relation. It would be interesting to investigate generic complexity of the DLP with LHWPs. The first step toward this direction would be to estimate the number of distinct LHWP exponents.
